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Abstract
We introduce an adversarial method for pro-
ducing high-recall explanations of neural text
classifier decisions. Building on an existing ar-
chitecture for extractive explanations via hard
attention, we add an adversarial layer which
scans the residual of the attention for remain-
ing predictive signal. Motivated by the impor-
tant domain of detecting personal attacks in so-
cial media comments, we additionally demon-
strate the importance of manually setting a se-
mantically appropriate “default” behavior for
the model by explicitly manipulating its bias
term. We develop a validation set of human-
annotated personal attacks to evaluate the im-
pact of these changes.
1 Introduction
The task of explaining classifier decisions has re-
cently attracted increased attention from the re-
search community. It is important for several rea-
sons, including: 1) The increasing performance
gap between simple-and-interpretable models and
complex-but-opaque models (which demand more
sophisticated explanation techniques); 2) The in-
creasing ubiquity of machine learning in busi-
ness and government and the concomitant need
to understand the decisions of models in high-
stakes situations; and 3) A rising awareness of the
limitations of machine learning and the need for
ways to better utilize intrinsically unreliable mod-
els (whose weaknesses can potentially be amelio-
rated by good explanations).
A common way to explain why a model clas-
sified an example a certain way is to extract a
sparse subset of features that were responsible for
the model’s decision, sometimes described as a
saliency mask or “rationale” in the case of text
(Guidotti et al., 2018). This type of local expla-
nation may not completely elucidate why a given
example is assigned a given outcome, but it does
simplify the relationship by identifying what at-
tributes were considered in the decision.
Existing work on this topic has not explicitly ad-
dressed the problem of local feature redundancy.
That is, when two features are equally predictive
of an outcome, which of them should be included
in the saliency mask for that decision? Typical
sparsity constraints encourage minimal sufficient
masks–unveiling just enough of the example to
justify the outcome.
There are domains, however, where it may be
important to produce complete explanations rather
than minimal explanations. One example is the
task of detecting content in online social media
that violates a platform’s policies. Explanatory
models can potentially help human moderators
make quicker and more consistent decisions about
whether to remove comments (Lakkaraju et al.,
2016). However, we propose that truly minimal
explanations are liable to give only a partial por-
trait of why a comment is objectionable, making
it harder to render a fair holistic decision. If used
to explain to a poster why their post was removed,
a minimal explanation can actually be misleading,
by implying that some of what was objectionable
about their post was benign just because it didn’t
add marginal signal to the overall classification.
We use an extractive explanatory neural net-
work to identify which social media comments
contain personal attacks and which words in those
comments are the basis for classifying them as
containing personal attacks. We train this model
on a large dataset (Wulczyn et al., 2017) of com-
ments labeled for the presence of such attacks, and
use the explanatory capacity of the model to iden-
tify spans that constitute personal attacks within
those comments. We extend the work of (Lei et al.,
2016) in using one recurrent neural net (RNN)
to produce an explanatory hard-attention rationale
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Figure 1: An example of a highly-attacking comment from the test set, rationalized by the model
and a second RNN to make a prediction, the two
models trained in an end-to-end fashion.
To produce complete (i.e high-recall) explana-
tions, we add to this existing architecture a sec-
ond, adversarial predictive layer whose purpose is
to try to make predictions based on what is left out
of the rationale. We then add a term to the atten-
tion layer objective function which encourages it
to fool this secondary predictive layer into making
poor predictions by including all predictive signal
(i.e personal attacks) in the mask that it generates.
We also show that manipulating the model bias
term to set a semantically appropriate “default be-
havior” or “null hypothesis” for the model sig-
nificantly improves performance. That is, by ex-
plicitly choosing what output a zero-information,
empty explanation should correspond to, the
model is able to learn explanations that correspond
more closely with human-generated data.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper
are as follows:
• We articulate explanation as an adversarial
problem and introduce an adversarial scheme
for extraction of complete (high-recall) ex-
planations for text classifier decisions.
• We demonstrate the value of explicitly setting
a default output value in such an explanatory
model via bias term manipulation.
• We apply explanatory machine learning for
the first time to the task of detecting personal
attacks in social media comments, and de-
velop a validation dataset for this purpose.
2 Related work
2.1 Online abuse
Online abuse (of which personal attacks are a ma-
jor dimension) has recently attracted increased at-
tention as a computational problem. Scholarly
work has assessed the prevalence and impact of
such abuse (Lenhart et al., 2016; Anderson et al.,
2014; Pew, 2016; Anderson et al., 2016), while
several initiatives have sought to construct datasets
for its study (Wulczyn et al., 2017; Abbott et al.,
2016; Kennedy et al., 2017; Napoles et al., 2017;
Golbeck et al., 2017).
Naturally, much recent work has gone into the
use of machine learning to detect online abuse and
its perpetrators (Nobata et al., 2016; Pavlopoulos
et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2015), including a work-
shop at the most recent ACL conference (Associ-
ation for Computational Linguistics, 2017). How-
ever, the idea of fully-automated moderation by
machine learning has attracted criticism as being
subject to bias, inaccuracy, manipulation and frus-
tration on the user end (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017;
Binns et al., 2017; Blackwell et al., 2018; Hosseini
et al., 2017; Adams and Dixon, 2017). We propose
interpretable models as one potential solution to
some of these problems.
2.2 Interpretable machine learning
Major points of division in the interpretability lit-
erature include: 1) local vs. global interpretability;
2) post-hoc vs. built-in interpretability; 3) expla-
nation type; 4) input data type; and 5) evaluation
metric. Our model is a built-in, feature-based lo-
cally interpretable model for text that we evaluate
Figure 2: An example of a not-very-attacking example from the test set, rationalized by the model
relative to a human gold-standard. Guidotti et al.
(2018) provides a recent survey of the field.
Recent work on interpretability has focused
on local (i.e. instancewise) feature-based ex-
planations. Attention models implicitly produce
this type of explanation in the form of attention
weights over input features. Lei et al. (2016) uti-
lizes a regularized hard attention mechanism to
identify the locally minimum sufficient subset of
tokens to make accurate predictions.
Post-hoc methods seek to retroactively probe
the behavior of an existing non-explanatory
model. These include model-specific gradient-
based attribution methods, pioneered by Si-
monyan et al. (2013) and reviewed recently by
Ancona et al. (2017), which have tended to origi-
nate in the image classification domain and trans-
fer to other domains such as text (e.g. Arras et al.
(2017)). Conversely, LIME (Ribeiro et al., 2016)
is a prominent recent model-agnostic work in this
space, building local linear approximations of a
model and using the coefficients thereof to explain
its behavior. Li et al. (2016) trains a hard attention
layer to flip the decisions of an existing model.
While feature-based explanations are the most
common approach, other forms have been pro-
posed, including: similarity to learned ”proto-
types” which represent clusters of items from
the training data (Li et al., 2017); high-precision
feature interaction rules (Ribeiro et al., 2018);
reference to predefined human-friendly concepts
(Kim et al., 2017); and generated natural lan-
guage (Ehsan et al., 2017). Likewise, many evalu-
ation criteria have been proposed. These include
fully automated evaluation (Arras et al., 2017);
comparison to human gold standards (Lei et al.,
2016); and human task performance (Nguyen,
2018). Doshi-Velez and Kim (2017) and Gilpin
et al. (2018) both present reviews and taxonomies
of evaluation types.
2.3 Adversarial learning
Generative Adversarial Networks (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) involve the use of a discriminative
model to help a generative model match its out-
put to an existing data distribution via an adver-
sarial minimax game. Such models have achieved
good results on various generative tasks such as
image synthesis (Zhang et al., 2018) and text gen-
eration (Yu et al., 2016). Recently, adversarial
schemes have begun to be adapted for non-strictly-
generative tasks such as fake review detection
(Aghakhani et al., 2018), improving the robustness
of predictive models to adversarial attacks (Zhao
et al., 2017) and image retrieval (Song, 2017).
Ideas similar to the adversarial scheme used in
this paper have come not from interpretability but
rather from weakly-supervised object localization.
Wei et al. (2017) uses a similar scheme to accom-
plish more complete detection of object shapes in
images by iteratively erasing the regions that a pre-
dictive model lends the most attention, and forcing
it to adjust to the occluded image.
3 Model
The goal of our architecture is to highlight per-
sonal attacks in text when such are present, and
to highlight little or nothing when there are none,
while also performing accurate overall prediction.
These requirements prompt two important edge
cases: first, there may be no particular predictive
signal in the comment text (i.e. no personal at-
tacks); in a more typical explanatory setting there
is always assumed to be some explanation for a de-
cision. Second, there may be redundant signal (i.e.
multiple personal attacks), more than is strictly re-
quired for accurate prediction, and we assume that
it is desirable to identify all of it. We address both
of these cases with modifications to the original
model architecture.
The model (Figure 3A) is a hard attention ar-
chitecture which uses one RNN to extract an at-
tention mask of either 0 or 1 for each token, and
a different RNN to make a prediction from the
attention-masked text (detailed in Figure 3B). Fol-
lowing (Lei et al., 2016), we refer to the mask-
producing layer g as the generator, but for clarity
we call the predictive layer f the predictor rather
than the encoder. Again following previous work,
we refer to the output z of the generator as the ra-
tionale, in that it rationalizes the prediction of the
predictor. We also refer to the inverse rationale,
defined as 1-z , as the antirationale.
To this basic two-layer scheme, we add a sec-
ondary, adversarial predictor f2, which views the
text masked by the antirationale rather than the ra-
tionale. The secondary predictor’s role is to act
as an adversarial discriminator–it tries to make ac-
curate predictions on the antirationale, while the
generator tries to prevent it from doing so, which
ensures that all predictive signal ends up in the ra-
tionale.
Figure 3: (A) Overall architecture. Generator and predictors are RNNs; (B) Detail of interaction between generator
and one predictor layer. G and P are recurrent units of any kind. O is a sigmoid output layer.
3.1 Primary predictor
The primary predictor f is an RNN which views
the input text masked by the rationale produced
by the generator. Its objective is simply to reduce
its own squared loss:
costf (z, x, y) =
[
f(x, z)− y]2 (1)
3.1.1 Default behavior via predictor bias
term manipulation
The default behavior of the model is the prediction
the predictor makes if the input is entirely masked
by the rationale: f(x, 0). When working with a
recurrent unit that has no internal bias term, this
behavior is entirely determined by the bias term of
the final sigmoid output layer, σ(wx + b), which
with typical random initialization of b results in a
default predicted value of roughly 0.5.
However, this 0.5 default value is not always op-
timal or semantically appropriate to the predictive
task. In the personal attack detection task, if no
attacks can be detected, the “natural” default tar-
get value for a text should be close to 0. We show
in the experiments that manually setting the out-
put layer bias term b to logit(0.05) = −2.94, so
that the default predicted value is 0.05, improves
model performance.
3.2 Secondary adversarial predictor
The secondary adversarial predictor is an RNN
which views the input text masked by the antira-
tionale, defined as 1 minus the rationale z. Its pur-
pose is to encourage high-recall explanations by
trying to make accurate predictions from the an-
tirationale, while the generator tries to prevent it
from doing so.
However, if the adversarial predictor’s objec-
tive function were simply
[
f2(x, 1 − z) − y
]2, it
would be able to gain an unfair advantage from
the presence of masking in the antirationale. See-
ing evidence of ”blanked-out” tokens would tell
it that personal attacks were present in that com-
ment, giving it strong hint that the target value is
close to 1.0 and vice-versa (see figure 4A).
To take away this advantage, the input to the
adversarial predictor has to be permuted such that
the mask itself is no longer correlated with the tar-
get value, while still allowing it to scan the antira-
tionale for residual predictive signal.
Our solution is to replace the masks of half the
items in a training batch with the masks of other
items in the batch. We order the batch by target
value. If item xi is selected for replacement, it
gets the mask of item xN−i where N is the size of
the batch. We call this permutation function c:
c(zi) = c(g(xi)) =
{
g(xi) if ki = 1
g(xN−i) if ki = 0
xi ∈ {x0, ..., xN} ki ∼ Bernoulli(0.5)
This ensures that low-target-value items get
masks associated with high target values and
vice-versa, to maximize the dissociation between
masks and target values. Figure 4B demonstrates
an example of such permutation. This may slow
down the learning, since the adversarial predictor
will sometimes have access to somewhat different
features of the input than it will have on the test
data, but it should not lead to incorrect learning,
Figure 4: (A) Fabricated sample batch masked by antirationales. Note the correlation between mask and target;
(B) The batch with some antirationales switched with those of other items. The correlation no longer holds.
since the training data always has the correct la-
bel, regardless of the mask.
With c(1 − z) as the permuted antirationale re-
sulting from applying this randomization process.
The objective for the secondary, adversarial pre-
dictor is its predictive accuracy on this permuted
antirationale:
costf2(z, x, y) =
[
f2(x, c(1− z))− y
]2 (2)
3.3 Generator
Given that the two predictors are trying to mini-
mize error on the rationale and (permuted) antira-
tionale respectively, the objective function for the
generator is as follows:
costg(z, x, y) = (3)[
f(x, z)− y]2 (3.1)
+λ1||z|| (3.2)
+λ1λ2
∑
t
|zt − zt−1| (3.3)
+λ3
[
f2(x, 1− z)− f2(x, 0)
]2 (3.4)
Terms 3.1-3.3 are present in the model of Lei
et al. Term 3.1 encourages the generator to al-
low the primary predictor to make accurate predic-
tions, prevents it from obscuring any tokens that
would prevent the predictor from doing so. Term
3.2 encourages the generator to produce minimal
rationales; obscuring as many tokens as possible.
Term 3.3 encourages rationale coherence by pun-
ishing the number of transitions in the rationale;
it encourages few contiguous phrases rather than
many fragments in the rationale.
In theory, these three terms ensure high pre-
cision, selecting the minimal (term 3.2) rationale
with sufficient signal for accurate prediction (term
3.1), subject to a coherence constraint (term 3.3).
Term 3.4, which is new, ensures recall by en-
couraging the adversarial predictor’s prediction on
the antirationale to be similar to the prediction it
would make with no information at all (aka the
default value). That is, the antirationale should
contain no predictive signal. Any personal at-
tacks left out of the rationale would appear in
the antirationale, letting the adversarial predictor
make a more accurate prediction, which would be
penalized by term 3.4.
3.4 Extractive Adversarial Network
In the GAN framework (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
a discriminator attempts to accurately classify syn-
thetic examples which a generator is striving to
match to the distribution of the true data. In our
framework, the adversarial predictor attempts to
accurately classify censored examples which the
generator is striving to strip of all predictive sig-
nal. The discriminator in the GAN framework is
trained half on real data, and half on fakes; our
adversarial predictor is trained half on correctly-
masked items and half on items with permuted
masks. Where our framework differs from GAN is
instead of generating adversarial examples which
are compared to true examples, our architecture
extracts a modified example out of an existing ex-
ample, and so can therefore be described as an Ex-
tractive Adversarial Network (EAN).
3.5 Implementation details
For comparability with the original algorithm,
we use the same recurrent unit (RCNN) and
REINFORCE-style policy gradient optimization
process (Williams, 1992) as Lei et al. (2016) to
force the generator outputs to be a discrete 0 or
1. In this framework, the continuous output of the
generator on each token is treated as a probability
from which the mask is then sampled to produce a
discrete value for each token. The gradient across
this discontinuity is approximated as:
∂Ez∼g(x)[costg(z, x, y)]
∂θg
= Ez∼g(x)
[
costg(z, x, y)
∂ log p(z|x)
∂θg
]
In theory, one would sample z several times
from the generator g to produce a good estimate
of the gradient. In practice, we find that a single
sample per epoch is sufficient. The predictors f
and f2 are trained as normal, as the error gradient
with respect to their parameters is smooth.
We employ a particular hard attention model,
but the idea of an adversarial critic is not limited
to either hard attention or any particular recurrent
unit. In a soft attention setting, our adversarial
scheme will actually encourage ”harder” attention
by encouraging any non-zero attention weight to
go to 1.0 (or else the inverse of that weight will
leave predictive signal in the anti-explanation).
The attention weights produced by the genera-
tor are applied to the predictor at the output rather
than the input level. When the recurrent unit P of
the predictor operates on a token xt modified by
attention weight zt, it ingests xt normally, but de-
pending on zt it either produces its own output or
forwards that of the previous token:
P (xt, zt) = ztPbase(xt) · (1− zt)Pbase(xt−1)
We investigate a similar range of sparsity hy-
perparameter values as the original model 1. The
weight on the inverse term only matters relative to
the model sparsity, as that term cooperates rather
than competing with the predictive accuracy term
(because it almost never hurts accuracy to add
more to the rationale). Therefore we set λ3 to 1.0
when we want to include the inverse term.
We use Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013) to cre-
ate input token word vectors and Adam (Kingma
and Ba, 2014) for optimization.
4 Data
To train our model of personal attacks, we use
the dataset introduced by (Wulczyn et al., 2017),
1λ1=[0.0003, 0.0006, 0.0009, 0.0012, 0.0015, 0.0018,
0.0021], λ2=[0, 1, 2]
which consists of roughly 100,000 Wikipedia re-
vision comments labeled via crowsourcing for ag-
gression, toxicity and the presence of personal at-
tacks. This dataset includes its own training, de-
velopment and test set split, which we also use.
To this dataset we add a small validation set of
personal attack rationales. 40 undergraduate stu-
dents used Brat (Stenetorp et al., 2012) to high-
light sections of comments that they considered to
constitute personal attacks. Comments were sam-
pled in a stratified manner from the development
and test sets of the Wulczyn et al. dataset, and
each student annotated roughly 150 comments,
with each comment viewed by roughly 4 anno-
tators. To calculate gold-standard rationales, we
take the majority vote among annotators for each
token in each comment. 1089 distinct comments
were annotated, split between a development and
test set of 549 and 540 examples respectively.
The Krippendorff’s alpha on our validation set
is 0.53 at the whole-comment level. This value
is comparable with that of Wulczyn et al. (2017)
(0.45). Agreement at the token level is a lower
0.41, because this includes tokens which are a
matter of preference among annotators, such as ar-
ticles and adverbs, as well as content tokens.
5 Experiments
We show that both modifications to the original al-
gorithm, bias term manipulation and inverse term,
increase the tokenwise F1 of the predicted ratio-
nales relative to our human-annotated test set. All
hyperparameters were tuned to maximize token-
wise F1 on the development set. 2
5.1 Baselines
We generate six baselines for comparison with our
variant of the (Lei et al., 2016) architecture. These
include the following:
Sigmoid predictor (logistic regression): Bag-of-
words representation with a sigmoid output layer.
RNN predictor: The same sequence model used
for the predictor, but with no generator layer.
Mean human performance: The mean token-
wise performance of human annotators measured
against the majority vote for the comments they
annotated (with their vote left out).
Sigmoid predictor + feature importance: Bag-
of-words representation with sigmoid output layer,
2λ1=0.0006 for variants without inverse term, λ1=0.0015
for variant with inverse term, λ2=2 (Tuned for maximum F1
on original model, then held constant for comparability)
Model
Rationale Prediction
Tokenwise Phrasewise
F1 Pr. Rec. F1 Pr. Rec. MSE Acc. F1
Sigmoid predictor - - - - - - 0.029 0.94 0.74
RNN predictor - - - - - - 0.018 0.95 0.78
Mean human performance 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.72 0.78 0.69 - - -
Sigmoid predictor + feature importance 0.20 0.62 0.12 0.64 0.59 0.70 0.029 0.94 0.74
RNN predictor + sigmoid generator 0.29 0.22 0.45 0.31 0.19 0.92 0.038 0.91 0.70
RNN predictor + LIME 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.4 0.25 0.96 0.018 0.95 0.78
Lei2016 0.44 0.38 0.52 0.51 0.38 0.83 0.021 0.95 0.77
Lei2016 + bias 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.60 0.46 0.86 0.02 0.95 0.77
Lei2016 + bias + inverse (EAN) 0.53 0.48 0.58 0.61 0.47 0.87 0.021 0.95 0.77
Table 1: Rationale performance relative to human annotations. Prediction accuracy is based on a binary threshold
of 0.5. Performance of both Lei2016 model variants is significantly different from the baseline model (McNemar’s
test, p < 0.05)
with post-hoc feature importance based on model
coefficients. Cutoff threshold for features tuned to
maximize rationale F1 on development set.
RNN predictor + sigmoid generator: Rationale
mask generated by sigmoid layer applied indepen-
dently to each input token. Prediction layer is
same as predictor.
RNN predictor + LIME: Rationale mask gener-
ated by applying LIME (Ribeiro et al., 2016) post-
hoc to RNN layer predictions. Masking threshold
tuned to maximize rationale F1.
5.2 Rationale performance
In the main experiment, we evaluate model ratio-
nales relative to rationales created by human anno-
tators. In our validation dataset, human annotators
typically chose to annotate personal attacks at the
phrase level; hence in the sentence “Get a job, you
hippie s***bag”, the majority-vote rationale con-
sists of the entire sentence, where it could arguably
consist of the last two or even the last word. There-
fore, in addition to tokenwise precision, recall and
positive F1, we also report a relaxed “phrasewise”
version of these metrics where any time we cap-
ture part of a contiguous rationale chunk, that is
considered a true positive.
We report results for the original model (i.e.
terms 3.1-3.3 in the objective function), the origi-
nal model with its bias term set for a default value
of 0.05, and the bias-modified model with the ad-
ditional inverse term (term 3.4). For every model
variant, we optimized hyperparameters for token-
wise F1 on the development set. We also report
results for the baselines described above.
Table 1 displays the results. The difference in
performance between the three baselines that don’t
use a RNN generator and the three model variants
that do demonstrates the importance of context in
recognizing personal attacks within text. The rel-
ative performance of the three variants of the Lei
et al. model show that both modifications, setting
the bias term and the addition of the adversarial
predictor, lead to marginal improvements in token-
wise F1. The best-performing model approaches
average human performance on this metric.
The phrasewise metric is relaxed. It allows a
contiguous personal attack sequence to be con-
sidered captured if even a single token from the
sequence is captured. The results on this metric
show that in an absolute sense, 87% of personal
attacks are at least partially captured by the algo-
rithm. The simplest baseline, which produces ra-
tionales by thresholding the coefficients of a lo-
gistic regression model, does deceptively well on
this metric by only identifying attacking words
like ”jerk” and ”a**hole”, but its poor tokenwise
performance shows that it doesn’t mimic human
highlighting very well.
5.3 Original model tokenwise recall
A perplexing result of the rationale performance
comparison is how good the tokenwise recall of
the model is without the inverse term. Without it,
the model is encouraged to find the minimal ra-
tionale which offers good predictive performance.
Comments with more than one personal attack
(e.g. Figure 1) constitute 29% of those with at
least one attack and 13% of all comments in our
validation set. For comments like these, the model
should in theory only identify one such attack.
Figure 5: Evolution of model loss over time with and
without bias term manipulation
However, it tends to find more information than
needed, leading to a higher-than-expected recall of
.52 in the best overall version of this variant.
To explain this behavior, we run a leave-one-
out experiment on the original+bias and origi-
nal+bias+inverse model variants. For each dis-
tinct contiguous rationale chunk predicted by each
model (when it generates multi-piece rationales),
we try removing this chunk from the predicted
rationale, running the prediction layer on the re-
duced rationale, and seeing whether the result low-
ers the value of the overall objective function.
For the original+bias model variant, we find that
performing this reduction improves the value of
the objective function 65% of the time. However,
the combined average impact of these reductions
on the objective function is to worsen it. What this
means is while 65% of distinct phrases discovered
by the generator are unnecessary for accurate pre-
diction, the 35% of them that are necessary lead to
a major decrease in predictive accuracy.
That is, the generator “hedges its bets” with re-
spect to predictive accuracy by including more in-
formation in the rationales than it has to, and ex-
periences a better global optimum as a result. This
behavior is less prominent with the inclusion of the
inverse term, where the percentage of unnecessary
rationale phrases falls to 47%.
5.4 Impact of bias term manipulation
In theory, the model should learn a good bias term
for the predictor layer, and therefore the idea of ex-
plicitly initializing or fixing the bias term to match
the semantics of the task should not impact model
performance or represent much of a contribution.
In practice however, as figures 5 and 6 demon-
strate, the initialization of the bias term has a big
Figure 6: Evolution of development set rationale F1
score over time with and without bias term manipula-
tion
impact on even the long-term learning behavior of
the model. Using the best hyperparameters for the
original no-bias, no-inverse-term model, figure 5
shows that either initializing or permanently fix-
ing the predictor bias for a default output value of
0.05 leads to improved model loss with respect to
its own objective function. Figure 6 shows a simi-
lar pattern for tokenwise F1 score.
6 Discussion and future work
One interpretation of the impact of the bias term
on model behavior is that an explanation of “why”
is really an explanation of “why not”–that is, an
explanation is information that distinguishes an
item from some alternative hypothesis, and explic-
itly choosing what this alternative is can improve
explanation performance (particularly precision).
Manually setting the model to produce some
reasonable default value for an empty rationale
makes sense in our setting, but not in domains
where there is no default value, such as the beer
review dataset of (Lei et al., 2016). A more gen-
eral approach would be to base explanations on
confidence rather than accuracy, where the default
value would simply be the mean and variance of
the training data, and explanations would consist
of tokens that tighten the bounds on the output.
A surprising finding is that the original algo-
rithm often ends up defying its own objective and
finds more complete rationales than needed. The
leave-one-out experiment described above sug-
gests that the reason for this behavior is that it
is how the generator deals with predictive uncer-
tainty, and that it achieves a better global optimum
by producing locally suboptimal rationales.
While this “bug” proves useful in our case, it
Figure 7: Further examples of labeled and rationalized comments. Items E) and G) show that the algorithm
struggles with sarcasm.
may not generalize. In our setting the adversarial
predictor gives a modest improvement in recall;
it will produce a larger improvement in settings
where the unaltered algorithm is more successful
at producing the minimal explanations described
by its objective function. Li et al. (2016) finds that
a memory network predictor requires less occlu-
sion than an LSTM to flip its predictions, indicat-
ing that choice of model can effect completeness
of explanations.
In theory, interpretable models can aid human
moderaters by pointing them directly at the po-
tentially objectionable content in a comment and
giving them a starting point for making their own
holistic decision about the comment. However,
there are potential pitfalls. Adding explanations as
a model output gives the model another way to be
wrong–one which humans may be even less able
to troubleshoot than simple misclassification. Re-
latedly, explanations may inspire overconfidence
in model predictions. Extensive user testing would
clearly be needed before any deployment.
One final concern is the question of whether
human-like explanations are really optimal expla-
nations. Are high-recall explanations that mimic
human highlighting tendencies really optimal for
the types of moderating/self-moderating tasks in-
volved in the domain of personal attacks in on-
line social media? Again, this question can only
be answered with human subject experimentation,
which we plan to approach in future work.
7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to frame ex-
planation as an adversarial problem, thereby ad-
dressing explanation recall for the first time that
we are aware of. We do so by introducing an
adversarial framework (an “extractive adversarial
network”) for ensuring that redundant predictive
signal is not omitted from a model’s explanations.
We also show that choosing a null hypothesis for
the model by setting the model bias term improves
explanation precision.
Secondarily, we make a domain-specific con-
tribution by applying interpretable machine learn-
ing for the first time to the problem of identifying
personal attacks in social media comments, with
the hope of developing more transparent semi-
automated moderation systems. We show that we
approach human performance on a dataset we de-
velop for this purpose.
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